Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Fighting from a DistanceHow Filipino Exiles Helped Topple a Dictator$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jose V. Fuentecilla

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780252037580

Published to Illinois Scholarship Online: April 2017

DOI: 10.5406/illinois/9780252037580.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM ILLINOIS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.illinois.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Illinois University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in ISO for personal use (for details see www.illinois.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 23 January 2019

Learning How to Lobby

Learning How to Lobby

How the United States Fought the Exiles

(p.44) Chapter 7 Learning How to Lobby
Fighting from a Distance

Jose V. Fuentecilla

University of Illinois Press

This chapter focuses on the lobbying efforts of political exiles. Marcos and his military establishment were essential to the considerable U.S. interests in the Philippines. In turn, Marcos' military had an ongoing need for hardware and training from the United States. This symbiotic relationship dictated the ebb and flow of military aid money each year. By portraying U.S.-supplied security forces as the chief instrument keeping Marcos in power, the opposition hoped to either eliminate or reduce the amount of military aid earmarked for the Philippines. During deliberations on the 1973 aid bill, an amendment was introduced by Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota on December 5, 1973, that would deny assistance to any country that imprisoned its citizens for political purposes. An earlier Abourezk amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 would have prohibited the use of aid funds for police, prisons, internal intelligence, or the maintenance of internal security forces. Both amendments were defeated. Given the United States' utter dependence on its Philippine bases, it was unrealistic to think that Congress would risk losing them by cutting off all aid to Marcos. The best the exile lobbyists could hope for was a moderation in the regime's behavior, such as releasing political prisoners or dropping the use of torture.

Keywords:   political exiles, anti-martial law activists, United States, foreign policy, defense policy, military aid, James Abourezk

Illinois Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.